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Abstract
This paper examines the arguments for changing the ways that UK drug prices are regulated. In the
UK, NHS pharmaceutical expenditures on branded drugs, currently worth about £3 billion a year,
have been regulated by the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) since 1978. We argue
that, in publicly funded healthcare systems, pharmaceutical price regulation is necessitated by a
tendency towards excessive government expenditure because of over-prescription and the
monopoly power of firms with on-patent drugs. We briefly explain the operation of the PPRS,
which is based on rate-of-return regulation, and discuss its merits and drawbacks. We then consider
five alternative pricing systems: free pricing, therapeutic benefit pricing, international reference
pricing, therapeutic reference pricing and RPI – X price regulation. However, we reject all these
alternatives in favour of a reformed PPRS. We suggest three potential reforms of the PPRS: an
RPI – X cost allowance if feasible or a widening of the rate-of-return bands otherwise; the
introduction of a marketing innovation allowance; and greater regulatory transparency.
JEL classification: L5, L6, D4.
I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling the price of drugs is a major issue on the policy agenda of most
modern governments. The reasons are clear. On the one hand, modern states are
generally assumed to have a duty to provide at least a minimum level of
healthcare services for their citizens. The costs of these healthcare services
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appear to be inexorably rising due to the combination of an ageing population,
technological advances in medical science and the brute fact that health (like
education) is a normal good — something that people want to devote
increasingly more of their income to, the richer they get. On the other hand,
British voters have appeared reluctant to elect parties committed to increased
taxation to pay for higher healthcare (Dilnot, 1996). One solution to this
situation would be to make patients pay a greater proportion of the costs of
healthcare by moving towards a US-style insurance-based system. But British
citizens seem highly reluctant to move towards any further ‘privatisation’ of the
NHS.
In the face of this dilemma, cutting pharmaceutical prices to reduce the drugs
bill seems very tempting. In fact, over the last decade, expenditure on drugs has
risen by about 10 per cent a year, and, in 1995–96, the total bill for NHS
pharmaceutical drugs stood at over £5 billion, about £3 billion of which went on
branded pharmaceuticals covered by the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme (PPRS) (Office of Health Economics, 1997). Since the current PPRS
agreement on drug pricing is in the final year of its five-year term, there have
been calls for deep price cuts.
To add to these budgetary pressures on prices, there is also the urgent matter
of international price regulation. In a globalised market, there is a constant
temptation for small countries to free-ride (by having low prices) on the implicit
subsidy given to pharmaceutical R. & D. by other countries that have higher
prices. Since UK sales account for only 3 per cent of global pharmaceutical
sales, the UK could potentially drastically cut prices and free-ride on the
incentives to undertake R. & D. provided by higher prices in the US and parts of
Europe. However, as a result of the UK’s global prominence in the
pharmaceutical industry, dramatic price reductions in the UK could precipitate a
bout of price-cutting by foreign regulators.
The debates over regulatory reform tend to be highly arcane, and the purpose
of this article is to clarify the issues for non-specialists. In Section II, the
rationale for pharmaceutical price control is discussed, whilst, in Section III, the
current UK PPRS regulatory scheme is evaluated. In Section IV, five alternatives
are considered but are ultimately rejected in favour of a reformed PPRS. Section
V discusses in more detail our potential reform proposals, and the final section
offers some conclusions.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION
In order to analyse the requirements of a pharmaceutical pricing scheme, we first
need to identify whether we need any price regulation at all. What distinguishes
the market for pharmaceutical products from any other market and creates the
need for price regulation?Regulating Drug Prices
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The fundamental feature of the health market in the UK and most other
countries is that consumers generally do not choose or pay for the goods they
consume. Even in countries such as the US where the burden of buying health
insurance is passed on to individuals, it is still doctors who decide on the
appropriate treatment and insurance companies which pay the particular costs.
There have been various reforms to make individuals more sensitive to the costs
of healthcare in the UK — for example, cost-sharing through prescription
charges. These charges do not reflect the relative prices of drugs, however, and
in any case most prescriptions are still free. Other moves have included reducing
the number of medicines that are allowed to be prescribed (the ‘limited list’
specifies medicines that are available on paid prescription) and encouraging the
further development of private healthcare. It is highly unlikely that Britain will
move to a system where individuals bear the primary responsibility for paying
directly for their healthcare in the near future. Although patient welfare is at the
heart of the health system, the key agents who decide what healthcare services
are provided to patients will remain the doctors.
1. To Regulate the Balance between Patient Care and Government Expenditure?
The provision of drugs by the NHS suffers from a classic principal–agent
problem. The government (the principal) would like doctors (its prescribing
agents) to prescribe in a cost-effective manner by evaluating every drug
prescription on the basis of a budgetary cost versus therapeutic benefit trade-off.
The therapeutic benefit is enjoyed by the individual as a patient; but the
budgetary cost is paid for by the individual (and his or her family) as a past,
present or future taxpayer. Ideally, only those drugs that could demonstrate
therapeutic value for money would be prescribed,
1 and not otherwise. Doctors,
however, are trained to treat illness, operate according to the principles of the
Hippocratic oath and are in the front line of the provision of healthcare. As a
result, it is not surprising that they are far more likely to be concerned with
patient welfare than with ensuring value-conscious prescribing. This will result
in the phenomenon of over-prescribing because doctors will not fully balance the
costs of additional prescriptions against their therapeutic benefits.
In addition, since doctors are likely to have only a limited concern for
expenditure control and generally lack comprehensive information on drug
prices (not least because prices can change weekly), they are relatively
unresponsive to price changes. This appears to be borne out by studies on
prescribing behaviour (Audit Commission, 1994 and 1995; Baines, Whynes and
Tolley, 1997). Since monopolists set higher prices for consumers who are more
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price-insensitive, in the absence of price regulation pharmaceutical firms will
presumably charge very high prices for their on-patent drugs. The combination
of the over-prescription effect and a high free market price would lead to socially
excessive expenditure in the absence of price regulation.
2. To Regulate the UK’s Contributions to Global R. & D. Costs?
Pharmaceutical sales in the UK only account for about 3 per cent of the world
market.
2 As a result, a cut in the prices of pharmaceutical drugs in the UK should
have only a minor effect on the global returns to R. & D. investment into new
drugs. However, if sufficient numbers of countries cut their pharmaceutical
prices, this could seriously damage the innovative ability of the industry
globally. It is possible that, because the UK is the world’s third largest exporter
of pharmaceutical drugs, global prices may be particularly sensitive to UK
prices. If so, any drastic price cut in the UK could provide a cue for retaliatory
price-cutting by regulators in other countries (Danzon, 1997). If British
regulators decided to introduce large price cuts, this could  provide sufficient
provocation for US and European regulators to follow suit. In addition, Table 1
demonstrates that UK prices actually feed directly into the prices of many other
European countries. This is because the UK price is a key ingredient in other
countries’ reference pricing schemes. This creates an additional channel for UK
prices to influence global prices. Thus dramatic reductions in the UK price of
pharmaceuticals could damage the long-run success of the UK pharmaceutical
industry via their effect on international prices.
TABLE 1











Therapeutic benefit Belgium, France, Sweden
Therapeutic reference pricing Germany
Free pricing US
Cost mark-ups Spain
aWe classify countries by the pricing mechanism that most accurately approximates their regime, although in
practice they implement schemes that may vary across drugs and combine elements from many of the various
regimes listed.
bIf UK is the country of origin for the product.
cUses the three lowest EU prices.
Sources: Burstall, 1997; Attridge, 1995; Kavanos, 1998.
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3. To Regulate the Activities of a Monopolist?
Pharmaceutical firms hold monopoly power over the supply of particular drugs
by virtue of their patents. However, this monopoly control is explicitly granted
by the patent system to reward innovation. The patent system attempts to get the
right balance between the demands of the consumers for rapid and cheap
dissemination of drugs and the need to provide a profit incentive for producers to
discover the drugs in the first place. There may be times when there are huge
pressures to reduce the patent rights of a company (for example, through
compulsorily licensing a life-saving drug), but if this happens there can be little
doubt that the incentive to conduct R. & D. is thereby reduced. The fact that
pharmaceutical firms are monopolist providers of their on-patent drugs does not
completely release them from the rigours of competition. There is competition at
the R. & D. stage as companies energetically try to leap-frog the current
technology with a new product innovation. There is also competition from
generics (chemically identical off-patent drugs) when a patent expires. In the US,
for example, Griliches and Cockburn (1995) show that generics typically sell for
30–50 per cent below the branded equivalent and that it is not unusual for a
generic to achieve a 50 per cent market share within a year of the patent
expiring. Hence, although profits are high in the industry and there is monopoly
power, this by itself is not a compelling argument for price regulation.
III. THE CURRENT PPRS: AN EVALUATION
The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme has regulated pharmaceutical
prices since 1978. The scheme influences the price of branded drugs but allows
complete freedom of pricing of non-branded (generic) drugs. The system is
unlike almost any other form of price regulation adopted by UK regulators, and
is actually somewhat of a misnomer, being a complicated form of rate-of-return
regulation. The complexity of the scheme is illustrated by the following candid
statement by Brian Mawhinney, the former Minister for Health, to a House of
Commons Select Committee on Health: ‘the PPRS is inordinately complicated
and I make it clear to the Committee that I would never take it as my question on
Mastermind’. This section provides a broad summary of the PPRS and we direct
the enthusiastic reader to the fuller explanation of the scheme provided by the
PPRS document and the PPRS reports to Parliament (Department of Health,
1993, 1996 and 1997).
Under the PPRS, firms are prevented from raising the prices of existing drugs
without the Department of Health’s permission, but they are allowed to price
new drugs freely subject to their total profit constraint. This constraint is defined
as a rate of return on their total NHS capital stock:
stock capital Allowable profits PPRS × = αFiscal Studies
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where α  is the firm-specific target rate of return. This target rate of return lies
within a band of 17–21 per cent, with each firm’s precise level of α  dependent
on the Department of Health’s view of each company’s degree of innovativeness
and its commitment to the UK. Around these target rates of return, there is a 25
per cent ‘margin of tolerance’ within which a firm’s returns can fall without it
being required to take any corrective action. If a firm’s return is above this
tolerance band, however, then it must cut drug prices or refund the surplus to the
Department of Health. If its rate of return falls below this tolerance band, then
the firm can apply for price increases.
In determining profits, the PPRS allows, on aggregate, the expensing of R. &
D. expenditure of up to about 20 per cent of sales. This is above the industry’s
global R. & D. intensity of about 11 per cent,
3 and so can be considered generous
towards R. & D. Expensing of sales promotion activities from profits of up to 9
per cent of sales is also allowed. This appears to be significantly less than the
levels of our main competitors for which estimates are available,
4 suggesting that
the PPRS is less than generous towards marketing activities.
Table 2 presents figures on the operation of the scheme. It contains aggregate
information on the figures that firms initially report to the Department of
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TABLE 2




Company’s initial report Negotiated out-turn
Home capital employed 2,422 1,935
Home sales 2,646 2,646
Sales promotion 252 192
R. & D. 641 521
Other costs 1,718 1,553
Total costs 2,610 2,266
Total profits 35 380
Repayments 29
Residual profit 350
Return on capital 1.4% 18.1%
aCompanies whose sales–capital ratio is greater than 3.75 are regulated on a return-on-sales instead of a
return-on-capital basis. These firms account for around 10 per cent of total NHS sales and represent those
firms that do not have major production facilities in the UK.
Source: Department of Health, 1997.Regulating Drug Prices
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Health’s PPRS team and the out-turns that are arrived at through negotiation.
The negotiation process involves the Department of Health attempting to
validate the figures provided by the pharmaceutical firms and moving from their
initial claims to a figure the Department views as more realistic. For example, as
a result of this negotiation process, the figure for the aggregate return on capital
is raised from the 1.4 per cent level that the firms initially reported to the
negotiated 18.1 per cent after repayments. It would be of great interest to know
in more detail the arguments involved in such a substantial disagreement of
opinion between the agents of industry and the state but, because of the secrecy
surrounding the PPRS (see below), it is impossible to judge how reasonable the
final numbers are.
1. Arguments for Abandoning the Current PPRS
There are three main criticisms of the PPRS: it allows excessively high prices, it
generates little incentive to cut costs and it lacks transparency. We examine each
in turn.
(a) The PPRS Allows Excessively High Prices
Under the PPRS, the pharmaceutical budget has risen by around 10 per cent a
year for the last two decades.
5 This has led to the criticism that the PPRS is too
soft on drug prices. One way to evaluate this claim would be to undertake
international comparisons of pharmaceutical prices. However, constructing
international price comparisons is fraught with problems of defining appropriate
samples, calculating sample weighting, making exchange rate adjustments and
comparing different pack and pill sizes (Attridge, 1995). As a result of these
methodological difficulties, studies often disagree on the exact position of the
UK in the international ranking between countries. In general, however, most
countries can be reasonably classified into one of three groups (Table 3), with
the UK in the group of countries with intermediately priced drugs.
TABLE 3
Pharmaceutical Price Comparisons for a Sample of Countries
High-price countries US
Intermediate-price countries Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, UK
Low-price countries France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Source: Based on price comparisons from Burstall (1997), Department of Health (1993, 1996 and 1997),
Mossialos (1997) and Reekie (1997).
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When considering this evidence to justify price cuts, one should also bear in
mind the comments made in Section II about the strength of the UK’s
pharmaceutical industry and her potentially pivotal position in global pricing.
Thus we cannot conclude that curbing excessively high prices provides sufficient
justification for reforming the PPRS.
(b) The PPRS Provides Little Incentive to Cut Costs
A major criticism of the PPRS is that it provides weak incentives for firms to
control costs. This is a general feature of rate-of-return regulation. If cost
improvements are passed straight through into lower prices, there is little reward
for managers expending time and effort in cutting costs. This leads to
phenomena such as the ‘export disincentive’, whereby firms are penalised with
lower NHS prices if they increase their capital productivity and export the
surplus, or (potentially) the Averch–Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson, 1962),
whereby firms choose an inefficiently high capital stock in order to increase their
allowable capital base. The Department of Health is well aware of the potential
for inefficient production and states in the PPRS document (Department of
Health, 1993) that only ‘reasonable costs of production’ are allowed to be
expensed. It has two mechanisms at its disposal to estimate the level of
reasonable costs, but both of these suffer from problems of asymmetric
information.
One approach involves undertaking yardstick comparisons between UK-
based pharmaceutical firms. However, there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of
yardstick comparisons when applied to the UK pharmaceutical industry. First,
the production processes for different drugs are not easily comparable, and
patented drugs, which the PPRS mainly regulates, are generally produced by
only one firm. Second, as with any form of yardstick comparisons applied to a
small number of firms, one might expect the UK pharmaceutical industry to
appreciate the zero-sum nature of cost-cutting exercises and the benefits from
tacitly agreeing not to pursue cost reductions too vigorously.
6 These problems
can be addressed to some extent by the comparison with each firm’s
international production cost data, such as those published in its annual accounts,
although once again problems of comparability and distortion of information will
occur.
Another approach to estimating reasonable production costs involves
comparing current costs with those in previous years for each firm. However, the
use of past performance comparisons can create a negative ratchet effect. Firms
may appreciate that cost reductions achieved in the current period will be
translated into demands for lower costs in future years. This provides the firm
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with a large incentive not to reveal information on its current costs because of
the fear that this will be translated into tougher requirements in the future.
Because of the difficulty of the Department of Health’s task in estimating
reasonable costs, it would appear that the PPRS provides only limited incentives
for firms to control costs.
7
(c) The PPRS Lacks Transparency
Numerous commentators, including the Parliamentary Health Committee,
8 have
expressed their concern over the secrecy surrounding the PPRS. The secrecy
prevents effective evaluation of the scheme, leads to the suspicion of regulatory
capture and increases uncertainty — an entry barrier to potential new entrants.
The recent provision of information in the Department of Health reports to
Parliament (1993, 1996 and 1997) on the workings of the PPRS has, however,
improved the awareness and transparency of the system. Nevertheless, major
decisions are still arrived at by a process of negotiation and the mechanics and
results of these negotiations are generally kept secret. For example, the process
by which the Department of Health negotiates up the aggregate rate-of-return
figures from 1.4 per cent to 18.1 per cent (see Table 2) is confidential but of
crucial importance to the operation of the PPRS.
2. Reasons for Keeping the Current PPRS
Against these criticisms, defenders of the PPRS point out its three main
advantages: stability, flexibility and its role in promoting the UK pharmaceutical
industry.
(a) The PPRS Provides a Stable Regulatory Environment
The regulatory literature emphasises the importance of creating a stable
regulatory environment in promoting long-term investment.
9 If incumbent firms
believe that, once they have finished their investment projects, regulators will
drastically cut prices, they may decide not to invest in the first place. That is, the
fear of being ‘held up’ by the regulator will play an important role in
determining the level of long-term investment undertaken by any regulated firm.
These issues are particularly relevant to the pharmaceutical industry because of
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8Department of Health, 1994.
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the long-term nature of the returns to R. & D.
10 By creating a stable regulatory
environment, the PPRS helps to encourage pharmaceutical firms to undertake
investments into new drugs and more efficient production facilities. The PPRS
has helped to maintain a stable regulatory regime over the last 20 years. This will
have generated a body of ‘reputational capital’, which will make it more
reputationally costly for the government to introduce drastic reforms, and so
would reduce the industry’s concerns over such moves if the PPRS were to be
continued. But, in addition, the fundamental characteristics of the PPRS system
itself are also important in generating stability — in particular, the five-year life
of agreements, the participation of the industry in negotiating the agreements and
the three-year targets for allowable R. & D. expenditure (Mossialos, 1997).
(b) The PPRS is a Flexible Regulatory Regime
The PPRS has a proven track record in adapting to a wide variety of firms over a
20-year period. This is against the backdrop of significant changes in the nature
of public healthcare in the UK with, for example, the introduction of the NHS
internal market. As a tried and tested pricing regime that appears robust to
significant institutional change, there would clearly be advantages in maintaining
the current PPRS for any government intent on further major reforms of the
NHS, as the current government appears to be. Furthermore, the PPRS can be
advocated on its track record of a relatively speedy introduction of new drugs to
the NHS and the additional benefits this provides to patients.
(c) The PPRS Promotes the UK Pharmaceutical Industry
Although it seems somewhat strange to argue that price regulation could assist
an industry’s development, the PPRS has been proposed as a candidate for
engendering the impressive track record of the UK pharmaceutical industry
(Thomas, 1994; Bloom and van Reenen, 1997). One explanation is that
pharmaceutical R. & D. may have, at least historically, displayed domestic
spillovers. By providing generous R. & D. expensing allowances, the PPRS
could have encouraged a more socially optimal level of R. & D. investment.
Another potential reason is that, by allowing for a generous rate of return, the
PPRS provided sufficient profits to obviate the problems of external financing,
which can be particularly acute for R. & D. investment. In addition, due to the
provision of a more generous rate of return on domestic than overseas capital
stock, the PPRS has also provided an incentive for firms to switch production
and R. & D. facilities to the UK. Finally, industry representatives also cite the
stability of the PPRS regulation over the last 20 years as an important factor
behind the UK’s pharmaceutical success, as outlined above.
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However, whilst the PPRS may have helped to foster the conditions necessary
to create a successful UK pharmaceutical industry, there are clearly other
important factors behind this success, such as the strong university tradition of
biomedical research, the role of the NHS and the early introduction of efficacy
regulation. Furthermore, because of the multinational nature of the UK’s largest
pharmaceutical firms and the global nature of today’s markets, the PPRS plays a
less important role now than it did historically.
11
None of these counter-arguments seems an adequate rebuttal of the critique of
the PPRS. But do the alternatives provide a more desirable approach to
pharmaceutical price regulation?
IV. ALTERNATIVE PRICING SCHEMES: FIVE OPTIONS
We consider five alternative pricing schemes which have been adopted in other
European countries, adopted in the regulation of UK utilities or suggested by
industry commentators. Although this list is not an exhaustive survey of all the
potential alternatives, we believe it includes any regulatory system (or minor
variant thereof) that merits further consideration.
1. Alternative 1: Free Pricing
Complete freedom of pricing is favoured by many drugs firms and is equivalent
to the essentially deregulated US solution. It would save administrative costs and
eliminate regulatory distortions. The need for price regulation, arising from
doctors’ incentives to over-prescribe and their limited price sensitivity, was
discussed in Section II. There have been a raft of reforms in Britain aimed at
improving the sensitivity of doctors to drug prices. GP fundholding and the
PRODIGY system
12 are two important examples. Although in the US healthcare
maintenance organisations (HMOs) have gone even further down this route, the
existing empirical evidence in Britain suggests that the increase in price
sensitivity has been limited (for example, Baines, Whynes and Tolley (1997)).
One apparent argument in favour of free pricing is that when doctors are
cash-limited, as they may soon be, price regulation could be relaxed since cash
limits provide an alternative mechanism to restrict the growth of the drugs
budget. However, even if the total level of NHS sales is fixed, individual drugs
firms will still wish to maximise their share of this budget. Since doctors do
display low price sensitivities, each firm will still face an incentive to raise its
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prices closer to the monopoly price for on-patent drugs. The resultant outcome
could be significantly higher drug prices (as occur in the US), which, given a
fixed budget, would require swingeing cuts in the levels of pharmaceuticals
prescriptions. This is neither politically nor economically desirable, even if it
were possible.
2. Alternative 2: Therapeutic Benefit Pricing
Under therapeutic benefit pricing, a panel of doctors adjudicate over the
therapeutic benefits patients receive and set prices accordingly (i.e. higher prices
for the most beneficial drugs).
13 This system has the advantage that it correctly
addresses the incentives for firms to develop socially beneficial drugs. The more
effective a drug and the wider the target group, the greater the value it provides
to society. Setting prices in relation to therapeutic benefits leads to a direct
relationship between profits and social value, providing incentives for firms to
undertake R. & D. that they believe will be socially beneficial. Thus therapeutic
benefit pricing provides incentives for dynamic efficiency — maximising the
expected social value of any outlay on R. & D.
In maximising social welfare, however, there are two general efficiency
components that could be targeted by a price regulation system (Mayer and
Vickers, 1996). The first objective is productive efficiency, which involves firms
producing pharmaceuticals in a cost-effective manner. For example, one
component of productive efficiency is the determination of the correct level of R.
& D., since R. & D. is an input into the dynamic production process. The second
objective of price regulation is allocative efficiency, which involves doctors
allocating pharmaceuticals in an efficient manner. By prescribing drugs only
when their therapeutic benefit outweighs their production cost, allocative
efficiency can be obtained. The problem with any pricing system is that, with
only one instrument (the price), it is not possible for the regulator to
simultaneously meet two objectives (productive efficiency and allocative
efficiency).
By targeting dynamic efficiency, therapeutic benefit pricing provides
incentives for the efficient use of R. & D. by firms but provides no incentives for
allocative efficiency on the part of doctors. In most European countries, it will
not be possible to target allocative efficiency with prices, since doctors will not
respond to price changes. Hence adopting a pricing scheme, such as therapeutic
benefit pricing, that targets dynamic efficiency appears entirely rational. In
contrast, UK doctors have been provided with incentives to prescribe in a price-
                                                                                                                                   
13For example, prices could be set as some linear function of quality-adjusted life years. Drummond, Jonsson
and Rutten (1997) undertake a comprehensive discussion of economic evaluations in drug pricing.Regulating Drug Prices
333
sensitive manner and do display some, albeit limited, price sensitivity. Thus
price regulation has the option of targeting allocative efficiency or dynamic
efficiency or some combination of both. As discussed earlier, since the UK only
accounts for around 3 per cent of the global market, UK prices will have only a
small impact on the dynamic incentives of globalised firms, making UK prices a
weak instrument for targeting dynamic efficiency. On the other hand, to the
extent that doctors display some form of price sensitivity, prices can target
allocative efficiency. So, if doctors do display price sensitivity and the
government is intent on encouraging this, adopting therapeutic benefit pricing
will ignore one targetable objective of price regulation.
In addition, there are substantial difficulties in systematically determining the
therapeutic values of drugs, and such a process could leave the regulator open to
legal challenge. Hence we do not advocate therapeutic benefit pricing as either a
desirable or an easily achievable alternative for the UK. In other European
countries, therapeutic benefit pricing would be a reasonable option if the
domestic market were large enough to have an impact on global R. & D. and if
governments had no intentions to encourage doctors to prescribe in a price-
sensitive manner.
3. Alternative 3: International Reference Pricing
An approach adopted by a number of European countries is reference pricing
based on a weighted average of other countries’ drug prices. Under this scheme,
regulators need only to choose the group of countries in the basket,
14 set the
weights on each country and adjust for exchange rate movements. This scheme
has the advantage that it is administratively simple and, depending on the basket
of countries, can provide prices that lie in the middle of some international price
span.
International reference pricing, however, is not really a separate and wholly
alternative type of price regulation. Instead, it reflects an average of pricing
systems in the comparator basket of countries. Since these pricing systems can
presumably be ranked on some desirability basis, it would be preferable to
choose the most desirable pricing system and place 100 per cent weight on it.
Going one step further, once a foreign pricing system has been chosen, it would
seem undesirable to leave domestic prices under the control of a foreign
regulator and exposed to exchange rate changes. This foreign system could be
adopted in the UK and perfected for the UK healthcare environment. Thus
reference pricing is just a mechanism to side-step the pharmaceutical price
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regulation debate by avoiding making any rational choice and instead taking an
average of all the systems in the basket as applied by foreign regulators. On this
basis, international reference pricing is not a real alternative for the UK.
15
4. Alternative 4: Therapeutic Reference Pricing
Another approach adopted by a number of European countries is to class drugs
that are therapeutically equivalent into groups and provide government
reimbursement only for the cost of the cheapest drug in the group. This should
drive prices down towards the lowest price in the group. However, the PPRS
does not control the prices of generic drugs for which there exist therapeutic
equivalents since competition and reimbursements at the market average price
ensure that no additional regulation is required. In fact, the difficulties of
regulating pharmaceutical prices concern precisely those drugs for which there is
no therapeutic equivalent so that pharmaceutical firms possess significant market
power. Therapeutic reference pricing is clearly unable to regulate the prices of
these drugs. Thus therapeutic reference pricing does not provide a suitable
alternative to the PPRS.
5. Alternative 5: RPI – X Price Regulation
RPI – X regulation was first used to regulate British Telecom in 1984 and has
since been widely adopted by other regulators in the UK and overseas. As such a
tried and tested formula for price regulation, it is an obvious candidate for
extension to the pharmaceutical sector as well.
Under RPI – X price regulation, firms would need to ensure that a weighted
average of their price increases each year did not exceed the percentage increase
in the retail price index less X. The X factor could vary from firm to firm but
would be fixed between price reviews. It would be reset by the regulator at each
regulatory review — every five years, for example — allowing the PPRS
department to pass through to the NHS additional cost reductions from
pharmaceutical firms.
RPI – X price regulation provides firms with real incentives to cut production
costs since, between reset periods, any cost savings feed straight through into
profits. In the longer run, by adjusting the X factor to reflect past cost reductions,
the regulator can pass these cost savings on to the NHS in the form of lower
                                                                                                                                   
15For a small country with no domestic pharmaceutical industry to promote, however, the incentives would be
to charge as low a price as possible consistent with being supplied with drugs. This policy is limited by the
potential for parallel importing whereby low prices in one EU country are exported as lower prices in other EU
countries. Thus pharmaceutical firms will delay or refuse supply to any EU country whose prices are too out of
line with other EU countries (Danzon, 1997). Hence a reference pricing scheme based on the lowest prices in
other EU countries where drugs are currently being provided — for example, as approximately adopted by
Greece — should enable cost minimisation consistent with the supply of pharmaceuticals.Regulating Drug Prices
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prices. However, RPI – X pricing, as applied to the pharmaceutical sector, suffers
from three potential drawbacks.
First, it is not clear what X factor would be appropriate. On the one hand, a
high X factor, leading to a rapid erosion of individual drug prices over time,
would provide incentives for firms to continuously withdraw drugs from the
market and re-enter them with slight modifications as new drugs but at higher
prices. This has been a criticism of price regulation in France, Italy and Japan,
where rapid price erosion appears to have led to an excessively high turnover in
the drugs market as firms continually withdraw and re-enter drugs (Thomas,
1994). This wastes marketing resources and impedes doctors’ pharmaceutical
learning ability. On the other hand, a low X factor, implying slow price
reductions, may not be consistent with the total constraint on NHS spending if
firms are to be allowed the freedom to set their initial prices. Whether both of
these constraints on the X factor can be simultaneously satisfied is not clear. For
example, an X factor set at 5 per cent might leave prices too high over a drug’s
life cycle to meet NHS budgetary requirements whilst also reducing prices
rapidly enough to encourage firms to excessively churn their drugs portfolios.
This leaves some doubt about the feasibility of an RPI – X scheme.
Second, RPI – X pricing was not developed to cope with continuous product
innovation as occurs in the pharmaceutical industry. This raises problems over
how to introduce new drugs into the price index. Various introductory prices
have been suggested, including an initial period of free pricing or setting initial
prices at prevailing US levels.
Third, under the PPRS, rapid increases in the volume of drug prescriptions
lead to countervailing price reductions to ensure firms stay within their rate-of-
return limit. Under an RPI – X pricing regime, however, no such overall
constraint on NHS expenditure would apply, so that quantity changes would lead
straight through into budgetary changes. As a result, the NHS pharmaceuticals
budget could potentially be highly unstable and uncontrollable. This problem
could be exacerbated if firms increased their marketing activities in recognition
of their potential for far higher sales.
V. REFORM OF THE PPRS
From the discussion of the PPRS in Section III, it is clear that there are problems
with the current system. We suggest three potential reforms to address the
perceived problems of cost inefficiency and lack of transparency.
1a. Either: An RPI – X Cost Allowance
A major shortcoming of the PPRS, as noted above, was the limited incentive for
efficient operation. This is an important issue since ‘Other costs’ account for
about 60 per cent of the price of drugs (Table 2). Experience from regulating theFiscal Studies
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utilities suggests that providing appropriate incentives is important when
attempting to generate cost reductions. In addition, the cost reductions achieved
under the RPI – X pricing of utilities were not fully anticipated ex ante (Trade
and Industry Committee, 1996–97). Thus there could
16 be some reason to expect
that, if pharmaceutical firms were also given strong cost-reduction incentives,
then drugs costs could also be cut by 10–20 per cent, which would allow for
price reductions and an improved provision of drugs to patients under a fixed
drugs budget.
One remedy to the PPRS to introduce greater incentives for cost-cutting
would be to adopt RPI – X for costs only. Under an RPI – X cost allowance,
prices would be set in the standard PPRS manner except that the acceptable out-
turn for firms’ costs would be taken from a predetermined RPI – X index of costs
rather than the actual out-turn. If a firm managed to reduce production costs
faster than its RPI – X index, it would get to keep the surplus, whilst, in reverse,
firms would have to bear the financial impact if their costs rose by more than the
index. In this way, firms would be given the same incentives to cut costs as those
provided by the more standard RPI – X price regulation. So, to reiterate, the
system would operate in an identical manner to the current PPRS except that
costs taken into account would not be the actual measured costs but those taken
from an RPI – X cost index. Clearly, creating this RPI – X cost index would be a
crucial issue. The index would need to calculate a reasonable cost of production
for each firm for each possible level of drug production. To do this, the
regulators would need to devise a unit cost per drug measure for every drug, of
which a simple stylised example is provided in Table 4.
Creating this index would clearly place large informational burdens on the
regulators at the end of every five-year period when they needed to reset the
index.
17 However, such a system is not without international parallel. The
                                                                                                                                   
16There are factors other than regulation that could account for large cost reductions in utilities, such as the
change in ownership from the public to the private sector.
TABLE 4
A Stylised Example: RPI – X Cost Allowance for Firm Z
Index for year 1998:
Drug A: £1 per drug for the first 1,000 units; 50p thereafter.
Drug B: £5 per drug for the first 5,000 units; £4 for the next 10,000; £3 thereafter.
Drug C: £2 per drug for the first 100 units; £1.50 thereafter.
Cost allowance in each subsequent year to rise by RPI – X. X set at 6 per cent.Regulating Drug Prices
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Spanish authorities estimate the production costs of drugs on a product-by-
product basis (Kavanos, 1998), the Italians undertook this until 1993 (when it
was disbanded following a major corruption scandal), and President Clinton’s
Health Security Act proposed cost-plus regulation which would have required
individual drug production cost estimations (Danzon, 1997). Whether these
informational requirements could be met is not clear, in part because of the
secrecy surrounding the current information-gathering process under the PPRS.
However, if this were achievable, RPI – X costing could address the major
drawback of the current PPRS — the lack of incentives for efficient production.
1b. Or: Extending the Rate-of-Return Bands
If informational shortcomings prevent the introduction of a full RPI – X cost
allowance, it would still be highly desirable to increase the incentives for firms
to undertake cost-cutting activities. An amendment to the current scheme that
would help to achieve this would be a widening of the rate-of-return bands.
Under the PPRS, each firm is permitted to deviate by up to 25 per cent from its
rate-of-return target. Any returns that fall above this margin of tolerance must be
corrected with price changes or rebates. In reverse, any firm whose return falls
below the lower limit of the margin of tolerance can seek a price rise.
Widening this margin of tolerance would help to address the lack of
incentives to cut costs, because firms would get to keep the benefits from more
efficient production over a larger range of returns. Of course, in order to ensure
that this scheme did not increase the aggregate PPRS rate of return (and thus
prices), the target band could be raised or lowered from its current 17–21 per
cent range. This could be achieved so as to maintain a constant average rate of
return for the whole industry whilst allowing larger variation between firm
performances than under the current PPRS. Since more firms lie above than
below their target rates, increasing the band width would probably require a
compensating reduction in the central target to ensure that returns remained
constant on aggregate. This should improve efficiency levels without any
additional budgetary costs, but at the expense of a greater variation in firm
returns. However, the current variation of returns allowed under the PPRS is
significantly less than those observed for the FT500 on which the target band is
based. This suggests that some trade-off between increasing the inequality of
returns and lowering drug prices (achieved by efficiency pass-throughs) would
be desirable.
                                                                                                                                   
17New drugs could be costed as they currently are and entered into the RPI – X costing regime only after
enough years of data had been built up on them.Fiscal Studies
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2. Marketing Innovation Allowance
The current PPRS permits a similar level of marketing expensing (below 9 per
cent) across all firms, whatever their marketing needs. All further marketing
activity is non-expensable for the PPRS costs calculations. In general, marketing
activities that inform doctors of new drugs and trial results should be encouraged
as a way of promoting both better prescribing habits and price sensitivity (since
one requirement of price sensitivity is well-informed doctors). However,
marketing activities that are aimed at promoting one brand of a therapeutic
equivalent over another brand should be discouraged, simply because it is, on
aggregate, a waste of resources and doctors’ time. Thus, whilst informative
marketing activities should be expensable, brand-building marketing activities
should not be.
One proxy for the necessary level of informative marketing activity would be
the share of on-patent drugs in the total portfolio.
18 So a marketing innovation
allowance could attempt to promote informative marketing and discourage
brand-building by taking into account each company’s shares of on- and off-
patent drugs in its PPRS portfolio. For example, the relatively simple marketing
expense rule shown below, which would be applied on a firm-by-firm basis,
would achieve this whilst maintaining the current 9 per cent aggregate expensing
cap:





drugs PPRS all of as drugs patent on of share average National





Alternatively, R. & D. expenditure levels could be used to proxy for
informative marketing needs.
3. Greater Regulatory Transparency
Another lesson from the regulation of the utilities is that regulation evolves and
improves over time. This partly reflects learning by the regulators themselves but
also reflects the positive effect of discussion, research and criticism by external
commentators. Greater provision of information by the Department of Health
would facilitate a more extensive consideration of the issues, assisting the input
into the regulatory debate. In addition to concerns over the evolution of
regulation, there is also an issue of accountability, which was highlighted by the
Health Committee Session 1993–94 (Department of Health, 1994).
Furthermore, as has been recognised in the regulatory economics literature
since Stiglitz (1971), there exists the potential for regulatory capture. This
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generics (off-patent drugs that are prescribed under a brand name).Regulating Drug Prices
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suggests that the combination of extensive regulatory discretion, frequent and
extended exposure to industry participants, and limited external checks could
lead regulators to unduly favour the industry they are regulating. That the PPRS
regulatory department meets all these conditions clearly does not make it guilty
of regulatory capture. However, it highlights the danger that, even if regulatory
capture has not yet occurred, it presents a real danger and will draw continued
criticism. For example, it was suggested by the Parliamentary Health
Committee
19 that ‘If the scheme does result in an unfair tilting, there are grounds
for supposing that this may be in the direction of the industry rather than the
NHS’. Greater provision of information would enable outsiders to gauge whether
this was a valid concern and allay the suspicions of critics.
The Department of Health does provide some information on the operation of
the PPRS, much of which is contained in the annual PPRS reports to
Parliament,
20 but this is very limited in scope, with only a few tables of actual
figures on industry aggregates provided. We accept that complete transparency is
not realistic due to the need to protect commercially sensitive information and
the dynamics of the regulation. However, it would still be desirable to increase
the current level of transparency, and, to this end, we advocate the following
reforms:
•   publishing distributions of firms’ targets, reported annual financial returns
and negotiated out-turns;
•   publishing the frequency of firms reporting results outside their relevant 25
per cent band and the action taken;
•   publishing anonymised data close to or at the firm level on targets, annual
financial returns and out-turns, where consistent with adequate secrecy.
Historical data would still be useful — say, releasing information with a
three-year lag — and would present less serious confidentiality problems.
This list is not exhaustive and additional measures to those mentioned above are
also discussed by Bloor and Maynard (1997), Caves and Towse (1997) and
Mossialos (1997).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The provision of pharmaceuticals in publicly funded healthcare systems is
affected by informational asymmetries between patients, doctors and the
government. This results in both a tendency towards over-prescription and a lack
of price sensitivity on the part of doctors. Since the suppliers in the markets do
have some temporary monopolies through patents (justified as the reward for
                                                                                                                                   
19Contained in Department of Health (1994, p. 3).
20Department of Health, 1996 and 1997.Fiscal Studies
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past R. & D. efforts), price regulation will be required to curtail pharmaceutical
expenditure.
The UK Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) regulates the prices
of UK drugs sales to the NHS. The PPRS has been successful at creating a stable
and flexible regulatory environment. However, it suffers from a serious
drawback in that it provides little incentive for firms to cut costs. In addition, the
PPRS has been criticised for lacking transparency. We have considered five
alternative price regulation systems: free pricing, therapeutic benefit pricing,
international reference pricing, therapeutic reference pricing and RPI – X price
regulation. However, we rejected all these radical alternatives. Instead, we
propose maintaining the current PPRS but suggest the consideration of three
potential reforms, which are:
•   the introduction of an RPI – X cost allowance if feasible or the widening of
the rate-of-return bands;
•   the introduction of a marketing innovation allowance;
•   greater regulatory transparency.
An RPI – X cost allowance would provide firms with strong incentives to
tackle production costs, which account for about 60 per cent of prices. Given the
precedent of large cost reductions in the utilities sector, this could facilitate
substantial long-term price reductions. Even if this were not possible, it would
still be desirable to create greater incentives for productive efficiency by
widening the rate-of-return bands. The second reform — the introduction of a
marketing innovation allowance — is aimed at improving the informational
content of marketing activities, whilst our final reform — greater regulatory
transparency — addresses the need for informational feedback to enable
regulation to improve and evolve over time.
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